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Abstract 
This paper deals with two questions: First, what are the determinants of FDI? Second, what is 
the role of FDI in economic development? In order to provide some answers to these 
questions, we draw upon the existing theoretical and empirical literature as well as insights 
derived from five country studies that we have conducted. Important location advantages 
include a stable social, political and economic environment, liberal trade policies, and 
geographical proximity to large and growing economies. On the host country effects of FDI, 
we conclude that while FDI is not necessary to achieve economic development, the entry of 
foreign firms may play an important role in adding technology and competition to the host 
economies. However, when foreign firms compete with local firms in markets with imperfect 
competition, local firms will lose market shares and there will be an element of profit shifting 
to the favour of the foreign entrant. This problem is likely to be more important if foreign 
entry takes place in markets shielded from the competitive pressures of international trade.  
 
1 Introduction 
Growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) is perhaps the clearest sign of globalization in the 
past decade. The average annual growth rate of FDI has been 23 percent since 1986, which is 
twice as much as that of trade. Most international investments take place within the OECD 
area. However, during the 1990s, and until the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the share of FDI 
hosted by countries in the developing world was increasing.1 Measured as a share of host 
country GDP, FDI flows to developing countries are in fact greater than those to the 
developed world. 
Some people view the presence of multinational enterprises (MNE) in poor countries 
as a threat to economic development. Others see FDI as a potential source of economic 
growth. The present paper aims at clarifying the role of FDI in economic development and 
                                                 
1 The share increased from about 18 percent in 1990 to about 40 percent in 1994, but slipped back  to 
about 25 percent in 1999. 
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derive lessons and policy implications. We base our study on the existing literature, 
theoretical and empirical, and a survey of five countries that we have conducted, three in 
Asia, two in Africa. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the determinants of FDI.  In 
Section 3 we turn our attention to host country effects of FDI, focusing on FDI’s role in 
economic development.  The country studies are presented in section 4.  Section 5 concludes. 
2 Determinants of FDI 
The most common starting point for discussing firms’ choice of direct investment relative to 
other entry modes in a foreign market, is Dunning’s OLI framework (Dunning 1977, 1981). 
This approach to understanding FDI is well known, and we shall therefore only briefly 
mention its essential features.2 First, to be competitive in a foreign environment, a firm needs 
some Ownership advantage, in the form of a unique production process, a patented good, or 
access to more intangible assets like reputation, trademarks and management systems. This 
competitive advantage may be used to penetrate foreign markets in different ways. For a firm 
to choose FDI, rather than, say, exports, there must also exist some Location advantage in the 
foreign country. Location advantages may come in different forms; firms aiming at reducing 
costs may be attracted by low wages, firms wishing to expand its international market share 
may be attracted by a large home market, and so on. Finally, given that the firm has decided 
to produce abroad, it can choose between various contractual arrangements, including 
licensing agreements and strategic partnerships. The theory therefore predicts that there must 
exist some Internalization advantages making ownership preferable to more arms- length 
contracts. These advantages typically include a greater control over technology and reduced 
transaction costs. 
 
Vertical FDI 
FDI is commonly classified as vertical or horizontal. Vertical FDI involves a geographical 
decentralization of the firm’s production chain, where foreign affiliates in poorer countries 
typically produce labour- intensive intermediates that are shipped back to high-wage 
countries, often to the parent company itself. Vertical FDI is sometimes referred to as 
“efficiency seeking” FDI, since the main motive for the investment is to improve the cost 
effectiveness of the firm’s production. In the textile and clothing industry, for example, 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the OLI framework, see Markusen (1995) and Bjorvatn (2001). 
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global supply chains are common. The capital- intensive stages (textiles) are located in 
relatively capital rich countries, human capital intensive stages (design and up-market 
apparel) are located in human capital rich countries, and labour- intensive stages (apparel) are 
located in labour abundant countries. Another industry where the production process can 
easily be separated into stages that differ in factor intensity is the electronics industry, which 
has played a major role in the industrialization of Malaysia.   
 A particular category of efficiency seeking FDI is sometimes referred to as 
“technology seeking” FDI. The attraction of the location in this case is not necessarily the 
low cost of labour, but its unique competence. FDI from industrialized countries to the 
Bangalore district in India, often labelled the Silicon Valley of Asia, is presumably motivated 
both by cost efficiency and access to an advanced IT milieu. Indeed, India has the second 
largest stock of IT specialists in the world, only surpassed by the US. 
 
Horizontal FDI 
Horizontal multinational companies produce the same product in multiple plants, and service 
local markets through affiliate production rather than through exports from the home country 
of the MNE. 3 Most of the global FDI is horizontal. For instance, Brainard (1997) reports that 
as little as 13 percent of the overseas production of U.S.-owned foreign affiliates is shipped 
back to the United States, and that only 2 percent of the output produced by foreign affiliates 
located in the U.S. is shipped to their parents.  
Horizontal FDI is sometimes referred to as “market seeking” FDI. The advantage of 
being close to the customers may be due to factors such as reduced transportation costs, 
smaller cultural barriers or avoidance of tariffs. Some countries have used trade policy 
deliberately in order to attract foreign investment: By erecting high tariff barriers they have 
made it more profitable for foreign firms to set up local subsidiaries than to serve the market 
by export from other countries. 
For certain kinds of non-tradable services, such as real estate, hotels, retail trade, and 
part of the telecommunication, banking and financial sectors, there is no trade-off between 
trade and local production at all; market entry simply requires FDI or other contractual 
arrangements for local production.   The importance of FDI in services has increased over 
time, accounting for more than 50 percent of total world FDI stocks in 1999, and an even 
higher share of FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2001).   
                                                 
3 When a substantial share of the foreign affiliate’s sales is to third countries, the horizontal 
investment is often referred to as export platform FDI. 
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Multinationals involved in extraction or use of natural resources is yet another case of 
FDI where there is no alternative to the local presence of the firm. Endowments of oil, gas, 
minerals, forests and waterfalls may be the most important attraction for international 
investment in a number of poor countries.   
 
Greenfield versus acquisitions 
In addition to the horizontal and vertical dimension of FDI, investments may also be 
classified as either greenfield or acquisitions. A greenfield investment involves the    
establishment of a new production unit, whereas an acquisition is the purchase of (shares in) 
an already existing foreign company. 4 Most of the growth in FDI taking place in recent years 
has been in the form of acquisitions. Indeed, in 1999, acquisitions accounted for more than 80 
percent of global FDI. Between 60 and 80 percent of  FDI flows to developing countries, 
however, have been in the form of greenfield investments during the period 1995-99.  
  
Public sector 
The public sector potentially plays a decisive role in creating and strengthening a country’s 
location advantages through supplying public goods and services, educating the labour force, 
and defining and implementing economic policies (see Dunning and Narula, 1996, for a 
thorough discussion). All these public sector activities may increase the profitability of an 
investment project, whether domestic or foreign. Likewise, inefficient public policies may 
discourage investments. As an example, 16 leading MNEs operating in India named 
regulatory control, bureaucratic intervention, and the lack of adequate infrastructure, 
particularly telecommunications and transportation, as major difficulties in operating in that 
country. 5 Singapore, on the other hand, is well known for an excellent infrastructure and an 
efficient bureaucracy with a low corruption level, and is still an attractive location for inward 
FDI despite a high and rising cost level.   
A widely used instrument to attract foreign firms is the tax policy, of which Liberia is a 
well-known example from the shipping sector. We have also seen that several Asian and 
African countries have given special tax privileges to foreign investors, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector. Offering various incentives to attract FDI may certainly be a rational 
policy if foreign investment generates positive spillovers, since market forces alone would 
                                                 
4 To qualify as FDI, an acquisition must involve the purchase of at least 10 percent of the shares in the 
target firm. Otherwise, the purchase is classified as a portfolio investment.  
5 Cited in UNCTAD (1994), page 83. 
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then attract too little foreign entry. Nonetheless, there is a fear that the outcome of tax 
competition between countries will evolve into a “race to the bottom” where the host 
countries gain very little from FDI. International investment agreements are probably 
required in order to reduce such problems (Oman, 2000).  
In discussing public policy, it is important to bear in mind that firms not only seek 
business-friendly policies at a specific point in time. More importantly, an investment 
involves a long-term exposure to the economic and political conditions in the host country, 
and firms therefore look for some commitment from the government. They need to be 
assured that their investment is safe from expropriation, that profits can be transferred out of 
the country, and that potential disputes between the host government and the multinational 
firm will be solved in a fair and efficient way. Countries with a record of economic, political 
and social stability are likely to be attractive to foreign investment (Lipsey, 1999). 
3 Host country effects 
How may FDI affect economic growth and development, and what is the empirical evidence? 
In this section we shall draw upon the existing literature to shed light on these issues. Later, 
in the section that follows, we shall look more closely at the experience of five developing 
countries.  
FDI involves a combined flow of capital and technology. From growth and trade 
theory we know that capital inflows may increase GDP per capita in the capital importing 
country. Moreover, access to better technology, broadly defined, is the only source of 
sustained growth. Hence, the way in which more advanced technology spills over to the local 
economy, and the empirical importance of these spillovers, have been areas of intense 
research in recent years. 
FDI is obviously not the only source of capital and technology. Countries may rely on 
their own savings or borrow money in international markets to add to the capital stock. And 
countries may rely on domestic research and development (R&D) in order to upgrade 
technological sophistication. However, developing countries may face constraints on 
international credit markets, and may not have the resources necessary to undertake domestic 
R&D. Moreover, FDI implies an element of risk sharing between the capital owners and the 
capital importing countries that may make this type of capital flow more desirable than loans. 
And FDI may be, if not the only, then perhaps the most cost efficient way for poor countries 
to gain access to new technology.  
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Clearly, the positive impact on the local economy is likely to be greater if the economy 
suffers from high unemployment. First of all, there is a direct effect: everything else equal, 
establishments of foreign firms increase labour demand in the host economy. Second, there is 
an indirect effect, as the foreign firm links up with the local economy by demanding 
intermediate goods and producer services from local suppliers. This indirect effect also adds 
to labour demand, and should lead to reduced unemployment or increased wages or a 
combination of the two.  
In what now follows, we shall discuss in more detail three mechanisms that have 
received a lot of attention in the literature on host country effects of FDI, namely 
technological spillovers, linkage effects, and competition effects.  
 
Spillovers 
Firms that establish affiliates abroad typically have some technological advantages that allow 
them to compete successfully with local firms. Consequently, there should be a potential for 
host country firms to learn from the foreign affiliates. Empirical studies show that 
technological spillovers, which should result in both higher factor productivity for local firms 
and in higher factor rewards, should not be taken for granted. First, the quality of human 
capital in the least developed countries may be too low to make effective use of the 
technology introduced by foreign firms (Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee, 1995, Salvatore, 
1998, Haddad and Harrison, 1993, Kokko, 1994). This is also reflected in an empirical study 
by Blomström et al (1994), which shows that inflows of FDI have a significant positive effect 
on income growth for the most advanced developing countries, but no such effect on the least 
developed countries.6  
Second, countries that have relatively stringent restrictions on inward FDI and force 
foreign firms into some kind of partnership with local firms seem to obtain relatively little 
spillovers. The reason for this is presumably that the headquarters of multinational firms are 
more reluctant to bring new and sophisticated technologies to countries where they have less 
control over their proprietary knowledge (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1998).  
 
 
                                                 
6  It is often difficult to distinguish productivity spillovers from exit (crowding out) of local firms in 
analysis that use aggregate industry data. Blomström and Wolff (1994), for instance, show that there has been a 
convergence between the productivity level of efficient MNEs and less efficient local firms in Mexico. This 
may indicate that local firms have become more efficient due to spillovers from the MNEs. However, it may 
also indicate that the presence of MNEs has forced the least efficient local firms out of the market. 
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Linkages 
A related question to that of spillovers, is whether foreign firms develop linkages to local 
firms. Strong linkages imply the employment effect of FDI may be large. Moreover, 
interaction between local suppliers of intermediates and the foreign affiliate may be one 
channel through which learning takes place. For instance, foreign firms may place higher 
demands on the quality of the intermediates and on timely delivery, forcing local suppliers to 
become more efficient. More efficient local suppliers of intermediates will of course also 
benefit locally owned downstream firms.7  
In a survey of empirical literature, Lall (1981, 1992) finds that there are relatively 
strong linkages between import substituting MNEs and local firms in large economies and, 
not surprisingly, particularly in countries that have strict requirements of local content. The 
same is true for MNEs that gradually change from import substituting to export oriented 
production, especially those that rely on stable and unsophisticated technologies. Purely 
export oriented MNEs, on the other hand, tend to have weaker linkages with the local 
industry. According to Lall one explanation for this is that factors like wages and transport 
costs seem to be more important  for the localtion choices of these firms than access to 
locally produced intermediate goods. For export-oriented MNEs that operate in the most 
complex sectors of the electronics industry, it is thus found that efficiency requirements 
reduce the scope for domestic linkages in developing countries to practically nothing (Lall, 
1981:223).  
 
Competition 
Foreign entry may reduce the concentration of firms in a market, and thereby increase 
competition. This is likely to lead to lower prices, and perhaps a wider choice of goods. 
Tougher competition may also force firms to reduce organizational inefficiencies, so-called 
X-inefficiencies, in order to stay competitive. For evidence on this, see for example 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1998) and Kokko (1994).  
As a point of departure one may expect the pro-competitive effect to be strongest in the 
sectors that are otherwise relatively protected from foreign competition. However, as noted 
by Graham and Krugman (1995), there is likely to be a sectoral bias in trade protection, in the 
sense that countries tend to protect those sectors where the domestic industry has a 
comparative disadvantage. Allowing inward FDI into these sectors may therefore crowd out 
                                                 
7  Improvements in firms’ competitiveness due to demanding customers is a central argument in Porter 
(1990). 
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local firms, and generate significant market power and pure profits to foreign firms without 
necessarily increasing the competitive pressure. In the extreme case, local firms are wiped out 
of the market, leaving the foreign entrant with a monopoly position.  
Empirical studies indicate that the net gains from foreign investments are larger if they 
take place in sectors where the country has low barriers to trade (Salvatore, 1998) or, more 
generally, in sectors where the local firms are competitive (Kokko, 1994, and Salvatore, 
1998).8 But in any case, increased consumer surplus due to foreign entry must be weighed 
against losses in domestic producer surplus, as the local firms lose market shares to the 
foreign entrant. This is particularly serious if there are dynamic learning-by-doing effects in 
an industry, an argument underlying the infant industry policy implemented by a number of 
developing countries in the present and the past. In addition to the static profit-shifting effects 
of foreign entry noted above, there would then also be a dynamic loss to the host economy 
due to the reduced future competitiveness of local firms.   
 
4 Country studies 
This section discusses experience from Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa and 
Mozambique. The choice of countries has been guided partly by our prior knowledge of at 
least some of these countries, and partly by the fact that the countries together represent a 
fairly broad spectre of experiences in terms of FDI flows and FDI policies.  Table 1 presents 
some major economic and social indicators for the latest year available. 
                                                 
8  One qualification is needed here. One may expect that local firms that are sufficiently 
competitive to export the larger share of their output have a productivity level comparable to MNEs. 
Consistent with this view Blomström and Sjöholm (1998), in an analysis of Indonesian firms, find that 
MNEs do not significantly affect the efficiency of local export-oriented firms.  
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Table 1. Economic and social indicators 
 Korea Malaysia Mozambique Philippines South Africa 
Population, mill. 47.3 23.3 17.6 75.6 42.8 
GDP, USD bill. 457.2 89.3 3.8 75.2 125.9 
      
GDP per capita, 1960 904 1420 1153 1133 2191 
Real GDP growth, 1961-70 7.4 5.6 na 4.3 5.7 
Real GDP growth 1971-80 6.5 7.0 na 5.2 2.9 
Real GDP growth 1981-90 8.1 5.1 -0.3 1.3 0.5 
Real GDP growth 1991-99 4.6 5.6 5.2 2.7 1.5 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 31.2 26.5 32.6 19.9 14.2 
Exports (% of GDP) 44.3 131.5 11.7 67.0 29.1 
Schooling, male, (female) 15  (14) na 4  (3) na 14  (14) 
Corruption index, (ranking) 4.2  (42) 5  (36)  na 2.9  (65) 4.8  (38) 
Population, GDP, gross capital formation and exports are from 2000, schooling refers to expected years of 
schooling in 1997 and the corruption index is from the corruption perception index published in 2001, which 
ranks 91 countries and the index is a number between 0 and 10, declining with corruption level. GDP per capita 
in constant 1985 USD in 1960, and 1995 USD in 1999 . 
Sources:Penn World Tables, World Development Indicators and http://www.transparency.org/ 
 
The absolute level of FDI flows varies a lot both between the countries and within 
countries over time during the past decade as illustrated by figure 1.9  Malaysia was clearly 
the largest recipient of FDI inflows before the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98.  FDI inflows 
to the Philippines have fluctuated around a flat trend, while South Africa experienced an 
investment boom shortly after the first democratic election in 1994, but the boom has not 
been sustained.  Finally, Mozambique’s FDI flows are very small in absolute terms, but have 
increased tremendously.  Mozambique was the country with the highest FDI flows relative to 
GDP among the five in 1999 as shown in figure 2.   
 
 
                                                 
9 The first columns depict annual average FDI inflows during the period 1988-93. 
 10
Figure 1.  FDI inflows 
Source: UNCTAD (2000) 
 
 Figure 2.  FDI inflows relative to GDP 
Source: World Bank (2001) 
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4.1 South Korea10 
South Korea was the poorest country in our sample in 1960, but has grown rapidly since the 
Korean war and is at present by far the richest country in our sample. South Korea was totally 
dependent on foreign aid in 1960, when aid mainly from the US accounted for more than half 
of government revenue. This gave the US strong influence as far as industrial policy was 
concerned, forcing a more outward-oriented policy than the government wanted. South 
Korea’s development success has been attributed to  substantial investment in education at all 
levels and a relatively equal distribution of wealth and income. However, whether the success 
story has taken place due to, or in spite of, the country’s industrial policy is a disputed matter 
(Pack 2000).   
The industrial policy aimed at rapid industrialization and rapid development of 
infrastructure. Local savings were inadequate to finance the investments necessary for 
achieving the development goals, and investments therefore in large part had to be financed 
from abroad. The Korean government nevertheless led a very restrictive policy towards FDI 
and instead aimed at attracting foreign capital through loans. Since private companies did not 
have access to foreign financial markets, the government guaranteed private firms’ borrowing 
abroad through state-owned banks. A criterion for getting such government-guaranteed loans 
was export performance, and this criterion was strictly enforced. The government also put in 
place various export incentives.   
After the first industrialization phase with the establishment of labour- intensive 
manufacturing sectors, industrial policy aimed at fostering large-scale heavy industries. The 
instrument used in this development was the fostering of “national champions”, the so-called 
chaebols, which received generous financial support. The chaebols were successful in 
establishing internationally competitive heavy industries, and over time also high-technology 
industries. Low cost of capital and labour – the trade unions were oppressed heavy-handedly 
– and the discipline imposed by international competition are common explanations for the 
success of the chaebols. In addition, the Korean economic policy has been seen as flexible 
and able to adjust to new circumstances, at least until the mid 1990s. However, close ties 
between government and business, concentration of ownership and weak corporate 
governance over time developed into rigid structures that became obstacles to change and 
growth in a rapidly changing environment.   
                                                 
10 See Seljeflot (2001)  
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The Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 fully exposed the weakness of the corporate 
structures. Like crises before, this one also forced reforms, including the opening up of the 
economy to foreign investment. The opening process had, however, started in earnest when 
Korea joined the OECD in 1996. A new and liberal “Foreign Investment Promotion Act” 
came into force in 1998. The new policy had a strong and immediate effect on FDI as figure 
1 shows, but FDI was mainly in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A).   
The main lesson from the Korean case in shedding light on FDI and economic 
development, is perhaps that FDI is not necessary for economic growth. There are alternative 
ways of accessing capital and technology; purchasing machines on the international market 
and hiring foreign experts to communicate the technology to local workers has been the 
growth strategy of Korea. Whether this strategy is the most cost effective way to access 
foreign technology is of course debatable. The “inside-firms” in the industrialization process, 
the chaebols, were given handsome subsidies. But the subsidies were conditioned on success 
in international markets, and this has most likely induced Korean firms to cut costs and 
innovate.  
Still, the financial crisis in Asia exposed the relatively vulnerable condition of the 
Korean economy, and in particular its financial sector. The crisis in Korea can at least partly 
be explained by the close ties between a privileged business elite and government, which 
geared the economy to status quo rather than change. Still, the growth potential in Korea and 
in the region is substantial, and when restrictions on FDI were finally lifted, foreign investors 
entered the market in large scale, primarily through M&As as bits and pieces of the chaebols 
have been sold out.  
4.2 Malaysia11 
Peninsular Malaya achieved independence from Great Britain in 1957, and the present 
Malaysia was created in 1963. Partly due to large endowments of natural resources, Malaysia 
was by that time one of the richest countries in Asia. The country was a major supplier of raw 
materials to British industry from the outbreak of World War I and until independence, and 
during the 20th century Malaysia has had an openness ratio that is higher than in most other 
Asian countries. 
Malaysia was not allowed to build up any strong industrial sector while it was a 
colony, and had a weak industrial base when it became independent. In order to diversify its 
economy and build a strong domestic industrial sector, Malaysia therefore implemented an 
                                                 
11 See Kind and Ismail (2001) 
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import substitution strategy in 1957 where the emphasis was on serving the home market. 
This policy, which implied that the home market was protected by high formal and informal 
trade barriers, was used by a number of developing countries after World War II. Unlike for 
instance South Korea and Taiwan, Malaysia was not hostile towards inflows of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) to serve the home market. On the contrary, Malaysia actively encouraged 
FDI as a means to increase efficiency and get access to advanced technologies from Western 
countries. This policy mix was initially quite successful in terms of growth in manufacturing 
employment and GDP, but the government was quick to change strategy when it became 
clear that the policy was unable to generate long-run growth and gave excessive profit flows 
to foreign capital owners. Since 1971 Malaysia has therefore been an export-oriented 
economy,12 to a large extent relying on foreign investors. However, in order to reduce the 
profit shifting to other countries Malaysia no longer encourages foreign investors to serve the 
domestic market.  
Between 1985 and 1997 Malaysia had the sixth fastest growth rate in GDP in the 
world, with an annualised average of 4.9% per capita. During this period Malaysia 
experienced a significant increase in inward FDI from Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, who 
observed sharp increases in their cost levels. In order to stay internationally competitive 
labour intensive export-oriented Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean firms invested in 
neighbouring countries with lower wage costs.  
 The electronics industry is the most important manufacturing sector in Malaysia, and 
accounted for 66 percent of manufacturing exports in 1995 (compared to 46 percent in 1980). 
This sector has been totally dominated by foreign firms – more than 80 percent of total 
investments in the sector were FDI in the mid 1990s (Phang 1998).  The investments were 
initially undertaken in labour intensive activities, with little scope for knowledge spillovers 
and interaction with local firms. However, in an empirical study Ismail (2001) has found that 
the foreign firms in this sector over time have become more skill intensive, and developed 
stronger linkages to local industries and contributed to technology transfers to both local 
suppliers and local staff.  
There are several reasons for Malaysia’s success in attracting FDI. At least for the last 
three decades the Malaysian political system has been relatively stable, and the 
macroeconomic policy has been prudent. Inflation has been low, and there have been 
comparatively small fluctuations in the exchange rate of the Ringgit. Moreover, Malaysia 
                                                 
12 An exception is the years 1981-1985 when the country implemented an unsuccessful import 
substitution policy with emphasis on heavy industrialization. 
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implemented a major export-oriented strategy in the mid 1980s; this was an almost perfect 
timing, due to the need of Japan, Taiwan and Singapore to locate a larger share of their 
activities abroad.13 Compared to many neighbouring countries Malaysia has also benefited 
from a reasonably well-educated and English speaking labour force, and the government has 
actively held down wages in order to attract labour intensive industries and reduce 
unemployment.  
 The comparatively good infrastructure quality of Malaysia has also constituted an 
important location advantage for the country. The quality has been particularly good in the 
Malaysian Export Processing Zones (EPZs) that have been set up since 1971. Though many 
countries have EPZs, no one has been as successful as Malaysia in attracting manufacturing 
activity (both in absolute terms and as share of domestic manufacturing). Firms that have 
established themselves in the EPZs have received subsidized land rents and exemption from a 
large array of Malaysian taxes and duties, provided that the larger share of their output is 
exported to other countries. Indeed, firms that operate within the EPZs have generally not 
been allowed to sell on the domestic Malaysian market at all. Unfortunately, this has 
contributed to creating a dualistic structure of the Malaysian economy, with few links 
between those firms that operate within the EPZs and those that operate outside the EPZs. 
Moreover, there also seem to be relatively weak linkages between foreign and local firms 
within the EPZs. Thus, even though there exist cost-benefit analyses indicating the EPZs 
have been beneficial for Malaysia (e.g., Warr, 1987), there is clear evidence that Malaysia 
has a great challenge in integrating the production sectors. 
4.3 The Philippines14 
The Philippines was one of the most prosperous countries in Asia during the first decade after 
the Second World War and was the largest recipient of FDI inflows in the region in the 
1960s. Thereafter the economy stagnated. By 1995 GDP per capita in the Philippines was 75 
                                                 
13  A major reason for the FDIs undertaken by Japanese firms is that they were searching for 
alternative production sites after the “Plaza agreement” where Japan agreed to appreciate the Yen 
against the USD. The Plaza agreement was signed by the Group of Five (USA, Britain, West Germany, 
France and Japan) due to the increasingly larger trade surplus Japan had over the US. Subsequent to 
the Plaza agreement the Yen appreciated from Y260:USD 1 in 1985 to Y130:USD 1 in 1988 (Tan, 1997); 
the exchange rate thus doubled in just three years. Additionally, the rapid industrialization of Japan 
and the first generation Asian tigers resulted in sharp increases in their cost levels during the 1970s 
and 1980s, and this caused a massive migration of relatively low technology, energy-inefficient and 
labour intensive industries from these countries. 
14 See Kind (2000) 
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per cent lower than in South Korea, and the Philippines is no longer a major host of FDI in 
Asia.  
 The Philippines achieved independence from the USA in 1946, and initially there was 
a free trade agreement between the two countries. Due to an inefficient macroeconomic 
policy and falling export prices, the Philippines entered into a severe balance of payment 
crisis in 1949. The political outcome of this crisis was that the country adopted a full-scale 
import substitution policy, and imposed comprehensive control on imports and foreign 
exchange. The first years of import substitution apparently worked quite well, and the 
country was relatively successful in attracting FDI (primarily from the US). The majority of 
the foreign investments was made to serve the domestic market, and was concentrated in 
sectors protected by high trade barriers.  
However, as we have observed in many other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, the import substitution policy did not succeed beyond the “first easy stage”. The 
economy became slow to restructure, and the protection of the home market took on a 
permanent rather than a temporary character. This policy implied that both domestic and 
foreign investors in the Philippines were insulated from competition, and gave rise to 
extraordinary high profits despite long periods of negative growth in total factor productivity. 
Thereby foreign investors were able to extract large revenues from the Philippines, at the 
same time as the income distribution became extremely skewed. This in turn has resulted in a 
serious tension between capital and labour, with relatively militant labour unions.  
 Garments and IT-products are the most important export articles for the Philippines, 
but empirical studies find that firms in these sectors have very few linkages to the domestic 
economy, see, for instance, Cororaton and Abdula (1999:6). The same pattern is evident also 
in other sectors, and FDI in the Philippines does not seem to have contributed much to 
upgrading the production technologies in the country. Foreign firms have implemented very 
simple production processes with little scope for technological diffusion to local firms.  
It is interesting to compare Malaysia and the Philippines when analysing the effects of 
FDI in the IT sector. The production process for IT services and goods can be split into a 
large number of sub-processes, and is therefore well suited for a strategy where the MNEs 
outsource sub-tasks to different countries according to their comparative advantages. This 
strategy requires extensive intra-regional trade. Empirical studies therefore indicate that 
relatively open economies with good international infrastructure are best able to build up a 
domestic base of support industries to the IT sector. The Philippine trading system has been 
cumbersome, consisting of a large array of different formal and informal trade barriers (at 
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least until the 1990s). Malaysia, on the other hand, has greatly simplified its trading system 
over the last decades, and removed most trade barriers for export-oriented foreign firms. 
Thus, while both countries started with the most labour intensive operations in the IT sector, 
Malaysia has over time been able to produce more skill intensive goods and develop links to 
domestic firms. The Philippines, on the other hand, has continued to specialize in the lower 
end of the production chain.  
The Philippines has a reasonably well-educated labour force, with an average year of 
schooling that is higher than in most other Asian countries. This location advantage is partly 
offset by the relatively high wages in the country, at least partly due to powerful labour 
unions. Moreover, the country has witnessed repeated periods of labour unrest. The 
Philippines has therefore had problems in attracting labour intensive industries. In fact, the 
Philippines seem to lack clear locational advantages. The infrastructure is very poor by most 
standards, and due to high unemployment and large social inequalities the country has been 
plagued by political instability. This resulted in the People Power Revolution in 1986. Since 
then the Philippines has been a democratic country, but there were several coup attempts in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. There are thus great uncertainties involved for firms that 
invest in the Philippines. International studies further indicate that the notoriously inefficient 
and corrupt Philippine bureaucracy has been (and is) a major obstacle in attracting foreign 
investments. 
4.4 South Africa15 
South Africa is the largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, and it was the richest country in 
our sample in terms of GDP per capita in 1960, mainly due to its vast mineral resources.  The 
country has been the world’s largest producer and exporter of gold and other precious metals 
for almost a century.  Before the Second World War, South Africa was a relatively open 
economy with few restrictions on trade and foreign capital flows.  Due to the significant 
mineral rents, the country did not need capital inflows from abroad in order to finance its 
industrialization. Nevertheless, the manufacturing sector was largely established through 
foreign direct investment, joint ventures with foreign companies and licensing of foreign 
technology. In most cases, technology transfers were much more important than attracting 
foreign capital. 
The political developments in South Africa, particularly the apartheid policy 
introduced in 1948, provoked social unrest internally and condemnation from abroad, and the 
                                                 
15 See Nordås (2001) 
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country gradually became an international pariah. The economy became more inward 
looking, introducing import substitution and capital controls. As in the Asian countries 
discussed above, import substitution initially attracted foreign investment motivated by 
access to a protected local market.  The policy also ran into the same problems as in Asia.  In 
spite of this and strong opposition from the mining sector, the import substitution policy was 
maintained, and it was reinforced by sanctions imposed on the country from abroad. During 
the period 1986-94 the country did not have access to international capital markets and there 
was an oil embargo in place during the same period. During the sanctions period foreign 
investors divested and sold their shares to local companies.   
The mining sector’s considerable revenue was largely invested locally and resulted in 
the development of huge industrial and financial conglomerates and a highly concentrated 
ownership structure. There was nevertheless a limit to how much resources the 
conglomerates could profitably invest in a stagnating local economy, and the leading South 
African conglomerates became multinational companies and South Africa a net outward 
investor. In the year 2000, four South African companies are among the 100 largest 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE 100), two mining companies, one 
brewery and one financial services company.  Another special feature of the South African 
economy is a sophisticated financial services sector, accounting for a about the same share of 
GDP as manufacturing           
The first democratic election in South Africa in 1994 represented a turning point in 
South Africa’s economic and social development. Remaining sanctions (except the arms 
embargo) were lifted and the new government introduced a more open trade and investment 
policy and a more prudent macroeconomic policy, which brought inflation down and put 
government finances on a sound footing. There are very few restrictions on foreign direct 
investment left, but South Africa does not offer special  incentives to foreign investors. As 
opposed to the experience of Korea when it opened up to foreign investors, South Africa 
received very little FDI inflows. Instead the country experienced net outflows of FDI.  Less 
than ten percent of these investments are destined for the other SADC countries. Yet, about a 
quarter of total FDI to SADC comes from South Africa.16       
Why did the South African economy fail to attract FDI following the lifting of 
sanctions, liberalization and the euphoria at home and abroad facing the new South Africa?  
This is of course a difficult question, but the answer probably lies mainly in the long-term 
                                                 
16 SADC (Southern African Development Community) is a regional trading bloc aiming at 
introducing a free trade area by 2008.  
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commitment of resources involved in FDI and the lack of a track record of the new 
government.  Indeed, the liberal economic policy led by the new government has lost 
momentum and labour market reforms have even to some extent been reversed, as the liberal 
policy failed to create employment and general economic growth. This in turn is largely a 
legacy of apartheid, which had damaging and lasting effects on the economy. The regime not 
only actively discouraged the accumulation of human capital and imposed insurmountable 
barriers to entry into the modern economy for the majority of the population, it also broke 
down the social fabric of the black communities.   
South Africa’s localization advantages are  rich natural resources, good infrastructure, 
a stable policy environment, a highly developed financial market and a reasonably large 
market.  However, slow growth, lack of skills, a highly distortive trade policy and social 
unrest, including a high crime rate, are the major obstacles to FDI inflows, while FDI 
outflows continue unabated.    
4.5 Mozambique17 
Mozambique is a least developed country and emerged from a devastating civil war only in 
1992.  Since then the country has grown rapidly and growth has accelerated over time, only 
interrupted by floods in 2000. Emerging from a crisis and having a very low income and 
production level, it does not take much economic activity to generate high short-term growth.  
Nevertheless, Mozambique’s performance has been remarkable and the country has attracted 
substantial foreign direct investment in addition to aid inflows.  In fact, the country received 
the fourth largest FDI inflows per capita in Africa in 1999,18 and the sixth largest in absolute 
terms in 1998-99 (Odenthal 2001). What appears to have attracted foreign investors are on 
the one hand swift and comprehensive economic reforms entailing privatization, trade 
liberalization and public sector reforms, and on the other hand rich natural resources.   
The country has vast energy resources both in terms of hydropower and natural gas.  
The Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi river is among the largest hydropower plants in 
Africa with a production capacity by far exceeding local demand.  In addition the country has 
a rich natural gas field. The largest foreign investment project is a South African/ Japanese 
aluminium smelter plant, which benefits from supply of low-cost electricity.  Developments 
of the gas field are also under way. Mozambique is also rich in fertile land, fisheries and the 
country has a long coastline suitable for tourism. The country has thus received a number of 
                                                 
17 See Nordås and Pretorius (2000) 
18 If we count the Seychelles among African countries it was the fifth largest recipient. 
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foreign investments in agriculture, food processing and hotels. Finally, Mozambique has 
received significant foreign investments in the financial sector following privatisation of 
state-owned banks.   
One important factor for attracting FDI has been investments in infrastructure.  
Mozambique has traditionally been an important transit route and has provided port services 
for its land-locked neighbouring countries. During the civil war the transit routes were 
impassable, but rehabilitation has been a priority during the reconstruction of the country.  
The so-called Maputo corridor, a road and railway from the Maputo harbour in Mozambique 
to the central industrial district in Gauteng, South Africa is the cornerstone in Mozambique’s 
growth and development strategy.  Infrastructure has been upgraded in cooperation with 
South Africa, and an industrial development zone where investors enjoy investment 
incentives and exemptions from import duties has been established in the corridor.  This is 
also where the aluminium smelter plant is located.  The second largest transport corridor, the 
Beira corridor runs from the Beira harbour to Harare.  It has attracted FDI in labour-intensive 
industries, mainly from Mauritius (Odenthal 2001).  
Mozambique’s development strategy shows that a least developed country need not be 
marginalized as far as FDI flows are concerned.  When FDI is allowed and the business 
environment stable and predictable, it appears that business opportunities are not lost on 
investors.  It is, however, an open question to what extent the energy- intensive industries 
such as the aluminium smelter will improve welfare in Mozambique through linkages to the 
rest of the economy, skills transfers and foreign exchange, or whether it is simply a channel 
for subsidized exports of hydropower.   
In other sectors, FDI has created local jobs, opened up bottlenecks in the economy, 
particularly FDI in utilities and the financial sector, and created business opportunities for 
local suppliers.  Finally, we note that some of the FDI to secondary and tertiary sectors 
follow in the footsteps of FDI in natural resources, in order to service these activities. 
Examples are investments in financial services, construction and retail trade in the Maputo 
corridor and Maputo itself, servicing the infrastructure and Mozal projects and the people 
involved in them. FDI in natural resources may thus crowd in investments in other sectors. 
5  Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper we have focused on two questions. First, what are the determinants of FDI? 
Second, what is the role of FDI in economic development? From our country studies we 
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derive the following answers to these questions. First, on location advantages stimulating 
FDI: 
1. Stability: For a given expected rate of return, risk averse investors favour an 
environment with less uncertainty. Political, economic and social stability is 
therefore a critical factor in attracting foreign investment. An important reason for 
instability is likely to be large income inequalities in society. The Philippines is a 
case in point.  
2. Liberal trade regime: In an early stage of economic development, a country’s 
main location advantage is likely to be low labour costs (rather than a large 
domestic market). Hence, foreign investors will typically seek to export most of 
what is produced in the foreign affiliate. Moreover, important intermediates may 
have to be shipped to the affiliate from abroad, for instance the MNE’s home 
country. Openness to trade, including low bureaucratic barriers, is an important 
location advantage. Malaysia is a good example in this respect. 
3. Access to large and growing markets: Geographical, and perhaps historical and 
cultural, proximity to large and growing markets is an important advantage for a 
less developed economy. In order to keep transaction costs low, firms seeking to 
decentralize the production chain by locating labour intensive operations in low-
cost countries, will typically favour countries that are not far away. In addition, 
being close to larger and growing economies makes a less advanced country an 
interesting site for export platform FDI from outside the region. Both Malaysia and 
Mozambique have benefited from being close to their respective economic 
superpowers, Japan and South-Africa. 
4. Infrastructure: Access to good communication networks is of key importance to 
many MNEs seeking new investment opportunities. Malaysia provides excellent 
infrastructure to investors, particularly in its export processing zones, and 
Mozambique is rapidly upgrading its infrastructure quality in its industrial zones.   
Second, on host country effects: 
5. Economic development can be achieved without FDI inflows:  The case of 
South-Korea shows with full clarity that impressive growth rates can be achieved 
with very little foreign investment. The country has relied on high domestic saving 
rates and foreign loans for investment, and domestic R&D, reverse engineering, 
and import of foreign experts in upgrading local technology and know-how. 
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6. FDI may be important for sustained growth: Sustained economic growth 
requires technological change, where new firms with new ideas can enter and 
where old firms with old ideas may disappear. Easy entry and exit of firms is 
therefore important in the development process. Foreign entry may be particularly 
important in promoting competition, since foreign owners are less likely to be part 
of informal, networks that may serve to limit domestic competition. In other words, 
foreign entry may create more “turbulence” in the market than would entry by a 
local firm. Many of the fast-growing economies of East Asia have shielded local 
producers from national and international competition. It is likely the inefficiencies 
that were allowed to develop in these protected markets is one reason for the depth 
of the financial crisis in Asia starting in 1997. 
7. Profit shifting may be a problem, particularly when local markets are shielded 
from international trade: Foreign firms entering a market and competing with 
local firms in markets for output and/or inputs may cause local firms to exit the 
market, without necessarily increasing the competitive pressure. This problem is 
particularly serious when local markets are protected from international trade, and 
hence large profits may be captured by entering the market. The Philippines, and  
Malaysia before the early 1970s, may serve as an example on this. 
8. Linkages and spillovers: Local suppliers may be able to provide intermediates to 
foreign affiliates, and over time, these supplies may become more and more skill 
intensive. Extensive linkages with local firms represent one way in which 
technological spillovers may be transmitted to the local economy. In a market 
characterized by little competition, spillovers are likely to be small, since the need 
to innovate and upgrade technology in order to survive in the market, and therefore 
the incentive to do so, is also small. Again the Philippines may serve as an 
example. 
 
 Geographical proximity to rich and rapidly developing countries is obviously an 
advantage to less developed countries in terms of attracting FDI. When Japanese companies 
invested abroad in order to reduce labour costs, they naturally chose locations in the region in 
order to minimize transaction costs associated with the decentralization of production chains. 
Later, other countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore have been added to the list of 
important sources of FDI in the region. This is an example of the “flying goose” model, with 
Japan being the lead goose. 
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 South Africa is the economic superpower in Southern Africa, and South African 
firms do invest in neighbouring countries, such as Mozambique. Mozambique offers 
investors a business friendly economic policy, including the provision of high quality 
infrastructure in the Maputo corridor. These policies combined with a rich endowment of 
various natural resources, have attracted an impressive amount of FDI in recent years. 
However, the South African economy clearly lacks the dynamism and strength of, say, the 
Japanese economy in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. This obviously places poor countries in 
Southern Africa at a disadvantage relative to poor countries in East Asia. 
  While FDI is not needed to generate growth, one could argue that sustained growth 
requires flexible markets, with easy entry and exit of firms, and that foreign entry may play 
an important role in this respect. Most Asian countries have been very protective of local 
markets. Even countries like Malaysia, that have encouraged and received FDI on a large 
scale, have discouraged foreign competition on the local market. Rigid markets and close ties 
between governments and favoured enterprises probably contributed to the financial and 
economic crisis in Asia. Opening up for foreign ownership and competition on local markets 
is one step that may improve economic efficiency and reduce the danger for similar crises in 
the future. Indeed, this has been the response of South Korea in the aftermath of the crisis.  
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